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The inclusion of joint implementation (JI) in the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change as a 
climate policy instrument is deemed a breakthrough for international cooperation on climate actions. It may 
provide a good opportunity for cooperation between industrialized and developing countries. Through an analysis 
of the economic effects of carbon emission limits for China, this paper provides the economic rationale for the 
industrialized countries to invest in JI projects in developing countries like China, where the costs of abating 
greenhouse gas emissions are lower than trying to achieve an equivalent abatement within their own territories. 
Moreover, the paper addresses some operational issues of JI, consensus regarding which is a precondition for the 
wide implementation of JI. Furthermore, the paper discusses the potential areas for JI projects that may be in 
China's interest. This discussion underlines that taking due consideration of local objectives and local conditions 
in designing JI projects will enhance their possibility of success. 
 
 
                                                 
1 This paper is based on the report prepared for the Netherlands Ministry of Housing, Spatial Planning and the 
Environment under Contract 95140042. The views expressed here are those of the author. 
Introduction 
 
 In 1992, the Norwegian delegation introduced the concept of joint implementation into the negotiations for 
the Framework Convention on Climate Change (FCCC, hereafter also referred to as the Climate Convention) 
aimed, in the long term, at stabilizing greenhouse gas (GHG) concentrations in the atmosphere. At the United 
Nations Conference on Environment and Development in Rio de Janeiro in 1992, JI was put into the final text of 
Article 4.2 of the FCCC that over 150 countries have already ratified. This is deemed a breakthrough for JI as a 
climate policy instrument. The inclusion of JI in the Climate Convention can also be regarded as a first step 
towards a global regime of tradable emission permits. 
 The industrialized countries are currently responsible for the majority of global GHG emissions, and must 
bear the major burden of the emission abatement. The developing countries, on the other hand, have very little 
historical responsibility for climate problems, but represent rapidly growing emissions sources in line with their 
industrialization and urbanization. Because economic development still remains the priority for the developing 
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countries, their climate policy would focus on the so-called win-win strategies unless the industrialized countries 
were willing to provide support for the developing countries to go beyond that. In this regard, JI may provide a 
good opportunity for cooperation between the industrialized and developing countries. By investing in JI projects 
in the developing countries where the costs of abating GHG emissions are lower than trying to achieve an 
equivalent abatement within the own territories, the industrialized countries can partly fulfil their emission 
abatement commitments and, at the same time, meet the developing countries' need for financial resources, 
technology and expertise in order to eradicate poverty and reform their inefficient energy sector and so on. 
 
 
Economic Rationale 
 
 China's contribution to global CO2 emissions, which is high already, is expected to grow significantly, even 
with large improvements in energy efficiency. Thus, advocates of controlling CO2 emissions call for substantial 
efforts in China. However, the Chinese authorities know that China's CO2 emissions, though high in relation to 
population size and energy use, so far have still been well below the world average level on a per capita basis, 
because of the low level of development of the Chinese economy. They are also aware that China is bound to rely 
mainly on coal as a fuel in the foreseeable future. Against this background, the Chinese authorities have claimed 
that China cannot be expected to make a significant contribution to solving the carbon emission problem, by 
arguing that ignoring the industrialized countries' responsibility for the majority of global CO2 emissions and 
simply asking for special action on China's part would seriously harm China's economic development and 
improvement of living standards. What then are the economic effects of possible future carbon limits for China? 
How can we let China be part of the solution, given the global characteristics of climate change and China's 
importance as a source of future CO2 emissions in line with its rapid economic growth? 
 Using the newly-developed dynamic computable general equilibrium (CGE) model, we have analysed the 
implications of two scenarios under which China's CO2 emissions in 2010 will be cut by 20% and 30% 
respectively relative to the baseline.2 The two emission targets are less restrictive in that they are not compared 
with the level of emissions in a single base year, but with the baseline CO2 emissions in 2010, the latter being 2.46 
times that in 1990. The carbon tax required to achieve a 20% cut in CO2 emissions in 2010 relative to the baseline 
is estimated to be US$ 18 at 1987 prices, while the corresponding figure necessary to achieve a 30% cut in CO2 
emissions in 2010 is estimated to be US$ 35 at 1987 prices. This means that a larger absolute cut in CO2 emissions 
will require a higher carbon tax. Higher tax also implies higher fuel-specific tax rates and hence higher prices of 
fossil fuels. 
 As shown in Table 1, even under the two less restrictive carbon emission scenarios, China's gross national 
product (GNP) drops by 1.5% and 2.8% respectively and its welfare measured in Hicksian equivalent variation 
drops by 1.1% and 1.8% respectively in 2010 relative to the baseline, indicating that the associated GNP and 
welfare losses tend to rise more sharply as the degree of the emission reduction increases. Given the fact that most 
studies surveyed by the IPCC (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change) second assessment report estimate 
 
    2 For a detailed description of the CGE model for China and its application, cf. ZhongXiang Z h a n g : The 
Economics of Energy Policy in China: Implications for Global Climate Change, New Horizons in Environmental 
Economics Series, Edward Elgar Publishing Limited, Cheltenham, England 1997; ZhongXiang Z h a n g : 
Macroeconomic Effects of CO2 Emission Limits: A Computable General Equilibrium Analysis for China, in: 
Journal of Policy Modeling, Vol. 20, 1998, No. 2, pp. 213-250. 
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that the economic losses under very restrictive carbon limits (e.g. stabilization or even 20% below 1990 levels in 
2010) are reported not to exceed 2% of GNP for the OECD countries, our results also support the general finding 
from global studies that China would be one of the regions hardest hit by carbon limits.3 This, combined with the 
industrialized countries being responsible for the majority of global CO2 emissions, explains the Chinese 
government stance on carbon abatement. 
 Table 2 shows the carbon tax levels across the countries and regions considered. It can be seen that there 
are significant differences in the carbon taxes required in order to achieve the same percentage of emission 
reductions relative to the baseline. This points to opportunities for joint implementation for abating CO2 emissions, 
although it is not without conceptual and operational problems. 
 Then, between which parties should JI take place? As shown in Table 2, the carbon taxes would be much 
higher in the industrialized countries than in the developing countries. This is, among other things, due to their 
already relatively energy-efficient economies, their limited possibilities for substituting less polluting energy 
sources and their already high pre-carbon tax energy prices as a result of existing energy taxes. However, the 
differences between the industrialized countries are far less than those between the industrialized countries and 
developing countries. The question arising from this is whether such differences are large enough to justify every JI 
deal between the industrialized countries, not least due to the assumed transaction costs. But Table 2 clearly 
indicates that there is a large potential for JI deals between the industrialized countries and developing countries. In 
addition to their cost-effectiveness, there are other arguments in favour of such deals. For example, in the 
developing countries, there is a pressing need for reform of their energy sectors, on both environmental and 
economic grounds. Thus, there is a widespread need for transfers of financial resources, technology and expertise 
from the industrialized countries. Such transfers may be encouraged by JI. JI projects will also contribute towards 
reducing local environmental problems, which will benefit both the industrialized countries and the developing 
countries. For example, Japan is extremely concerned about cross-border pollution in the form of acid rain orig-
inating from coal-fired power plants on the eastern coast of China. Clearly, JI projects for increased energy 
efficiency and fuel switches can make a positive contribution to this kind of problem. 
 
Operationalization of JI Projects 
 
 In brief, JI means that the investor country invests in emission abatement projects in another (host) country 
where the costs of abating GHG emissions are lower than trying to achieve an equivalent abatement at home and is 
credited, in whole or in part, for emission abatements in its own GHG accounts. JI enables the investor countries to 
"shop around" for the lowest way to limit emissions. Thus, it offers potential for reducing the global costs of GHG 
abatement. This is the economic rationale for JI. 
 Then, how should JI be implemented? Because a number of countries were sceptical about JI during the 
negotiations for the Climate Convention, the Convention offers no specific guidance on the application of JI and 
leaves it to the Conference of the Parties (CoP) to lay down the rules. Now, as the pilot JI projects are being 
launched, attention is increasingly focused on the actual implementation of JI. Certainly, the implementation of JI 
 
    3 Cf. Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC): Climate Change 1995: Economic and Social 
Dimensions of Climate Change, Contribution of Working Group III to the Second Assessment Report of the IPCC, 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1996. 
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will face numerous challenges because so many operational aspects have to be addressed. Because of the space 
limitation, however, our discussion will focus on the following most important aspects. 
 
Potential Benefits of JI 
 
 Greenhouse gases are uniformly mixed pollutants, i.e. one ton of a greenhouse gas emitted anywhere on 
earth has the same effect as one ton emitted somewhere else. Translated into the language of abatement strategies, 
this means that it does not matter whether greenhouse gas emissions are reduced in the United States or in China. 
What matters is whether we are able to reduce the emissions effectively on a global scale. This argument provides 
the environmental rationale for JI. The environmental argument in favour of JI is further supported by the 
following legal basis for JI. As stated in Article 3.3 of the FCCC, "efforts to address climate change may be carried 
out cooperatively by interested Parties". Moreover, Article 4.2(a) states the developed country Parties and other 
Parties included in Annex I (i.e. the OECD countries and countries with economies in transition) may implement ... 
policies and measures jointly with other Parties and may assist other Parties in contributing to the achievement of 
the objective of the Convention.4 Furthermore, the first CoP to the Convention in Berlin in April 1995 endorsed a 
pilot phase of JI referred to as activities implemented jointly (AIJ) among Annex I Parties and, on a voluntary 
basis, with non-Annex I Parties (i.e. developing countries). The pilot phase ends no later than the year 2000. 
 Until now, the most widely recognised benefit of JI is its potential to act to lower the costs of undertaking 
GHG abatement in the industrialized countries and hence to reduce the competitive disadvantage and carbon 
leakage associated with purely unilateral policies in these countries.5 Worldwide, this will achieve global 
abatement at a lower overall cost than would otherwise have been the case. 
 JI offers opportunities for the active involvement of the private sector, provided that financial or legal 
incentives to abate emissions are offered. This provides opportunities to attract additional funds from the private 
sector of the investor countries. Closely related to this, two points need to be made. First, the governments of 
Annex II countries (i.e. the OECD countries) should not regard private JI projects as a substitute for current official 
development assistance. Second, the first CoP decided that emission reductions achieved during the AIJ pilot phase 
are not allowed to be credited to current national commitments of investor countries under the FCCC. But crediting 
is an element unique to JI deals. Without crediting or other reward, JI projects are no different from traditional 
environmental aid and thus it is doubtful whether a large number of private JI projects will get off the ground. 
Indeed, since inception of the pilot phase, a relatively small number (currently around 40) of AIJ projects have so 
far been officially reported to the FCCC Secretariat as being accepted, approved or endorsed by the governments of 
the host and investor countries. Moreover, the geographical distribution of these projects is quite uneven, with very 
few AIJ projects being established in Africa and Asia. Given the short time horizon of the AIJ pilot phase and the 
lack of a diversified base of the current AIJ projects, there would not be enough practical experience to provide an 
empirical basis for a decision on whether to move forward beyond the pilot phase, if the current pattern continues. 
 As far as the developing countries are concerned, JI provides other positive environmental effects, since JI 
also helps to curb local pollution. The developing countries perspective on the benefits from a JI project is different 
 
    4 Articles 2.5 and 2.8 of the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer can be viewed as a 
limited precursor to JI under the FCCC. 
    5 Cf. C.J. J e p m a  (ed.): The Feasibility of Joint Implementation, Kluwer Academic Publishers, Dordrecht, 
The Netherlands 1995. 
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from those of the investor countries, the latter regarding abated global GHG emissions as the most important 
benefits from the project. Moreover, through participating in JI projects, the developing countries can get increased 
access to more advanced abatement technologies and additional funding. This will make it possible for the 
developing countries to lower energy use and hence emissions while achieving the same rate of economic growth 
(i.e. "technological leapfrogging"). Furthermore, the developing countries are even more vulnerable to climate 
change, and a broad commitment to JI would also reduce the damage potential from climate change in the 
developing countries themselves, since after all it is not only the industrialized countries whose climate will change 
if GHG emissions are not reduced. 
 
Forms of JI 
 
 JI can be broadly defined as an attempt to reduce the global costs of meeting a particular GHG emission 
target. JI in a wider sense could cover more general cooperation between two or more countries on measures to 
abate GHG emissions, but this type of JI has up to now been addressed to only a limited extent in the international 
climate change debate. Unless otherwise specified, the following discussion is therefore based on the current 
dominant definition of JI at the project level. 
 There are three possibilities of introducing JI at the project level. The first is a multilateral approach to JI 
through an institution such as Global Environment Facility (GEF). Specifically, countries wishing to invest in JI 
projects pool their resources to an independent fund, whereas other countries offering JI projects compete for the 
funding resources. During the duration of the selected JI project, each investor country receives the credit 
proportional to its share of the project portfolio. The major advantage of the multilateral approach is risk-sharing 
because project risks can be spread among all the investor countries. On the other hand, there are some 
disadvantages. For the sake of reducing administrative overheads, the approach results in a preference for large-
scale projects. Moreover, because of the multilateral characteristics, the approach disregards the diversified 
preferences of each investor country. All this will reduce the diversity of JI projects. Furthermore, because the 
project selection and approval cannot avoid the dangers of international bureaucracy and abuse of power, the 
approach would have serious drawbacks for both the efficiency and equity of the JI market. 
 Second, JI deals are through agreements between two governments. In this form, JI contracts are concluded 
at a government level and executing JI projects can be commissioned to public entities at a national, regional or 
municipal level, or to private companies and organizations. In either case, state authorities must be informed of the 
progress projects are making before issuing a certificate of approval. Moreover, in order to reduce administrative 
costs, an institution could be established to act on behalf of the countries concerned. This would represent a form of 
clearing house. Such a clearing house would deal with the tasks, such as the identification of JI projects, spreading 
risk, reducing transaction costs, and the close follow-up of individual projects. Clearly, this approach differs from 
the above-mentioned GEF approach because JI projects are not bundled together in a portfolio as in the GEF case. 
 Third, JI deals can be carried out by the private sector. Private companies may become actively involved in 
JI projects, if financial or legal incentives for them to abate emissions are provided. To some extent, the incentive 
for their involvement could come from a "first-mover advantage", which strengthens the international 
competitiveness (in world markets in the future) of such companies that take the lead in developing climate-benign 
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technologies.6 This may be particularly true for large companies. To a lesser extent, the involvement of the private 
sector is also because of a fear of new regulations at home and a desire for a positive environmental profile.7 This 
type of JI provides opportunities to attract additional funds from the private sector. Given the limited amount of 
public funds available, this approach is considered particularly important in order to obtain the necessary 
investments in JI projects. Moreover, the approach can bypass inefficient bureaucracies from which public projects 
often suffer, thus keeping transaction costs to a minimum. In addition to the private sector involvement, non-
governmental organisations (NGOs) should be given the opportunity to participate in JI projects, but their activities 
should focus on capacity building, monitoring and certification rather than pursuing JI projects per se. However, 
NGOs are strongly opposed to the concept of JI, and they have accused the industrialized countries of using JI as a 
means of buying their way out of responsibility for climate problems and at the same time postponing the radical 
changes in their own consumption patterns and passing the responsibility on to the developing countries.8 They 
will probably remain sceptical about JI unless they are convinced that clear criteria for JI have been established. 
 
Criteria for JI 
 
 JI is a climate policy instrument that may lead to comprehensive transfers of resources from rich to poor 
countries. From the beginning, however, the developing countries, with the support of western environmental 
NGOs, are strongly opposed to the concept of JI. If the potential for cost effectiveness and the transfer of resources 
is so large, why has it aroused so much opposition in the developing countries? This debate on JI has underlined 
the need to establish general criteria and conditions defining  how JI is to function. 
 According to the FCCC, the official criteria for JI will be laid down by the CoP. The type and size of the 
transaction costs of JI will depend on the criteria established by the CoP as well as the institutions and procedures 
designed to facilitate the development of JI projects.9 We think that the essential criteria for JI should include the 
following, at least from the developing countries point of view. 
 First, JI projects should be compatible with development priorities of the host countries. JI projects should 
bring about, in clear terms, real, measurable and long-term environmental benefits that would not have occurred in 
the absence of such projects. To this end, the prior acceptance, approval or endorsement by the national govern-
ments involved is deemed important, although this would add to approval costs. This is also in line with the Berlin 
Mandate, which states that "all activities implemented jointly under the pilot phase require prior acceptance, 
approval or endorsement by the Governments of Parties participating in these activities". Closely related to this, if 
one JI project is not compatible with the development priorities of the host countries, it is doubtful whether it can 
 
    6 R. L o s k e  and  S. O b e r t h ü r : Joint Implementation under the Climate Change Convention, in: 
International Environmental Affairs, Vol. 6, 1994, No. 1, pp. 45-58. 
    7 Nordic Council of Ministers thinks that this is the main reasons why private companies, mainly in the US, have 
carried out JI projects on a voluntary basis; cf. Nordic Council of Ministers: Joint Implementation as a Measure to 
Curb Climate Change: Nordic Perspectives and Priorities, TemaNord 534, Copenhagen 1995. 
    8 The Climate Network Europe and  Greenpeace, for instance, hold a critical view on JI. 
    9 The transaction costs of JI consist of search costs, negotiation costs, approval costs, monitoring costs, 
enforcement costs, and insurance costs. For a detailed discussion, cf. D.J. D u d e k  and J.B. W i e n e r : Joint 
Implementation and Transaction costs under the Climate Change Convention, OECD, Paris 1996. 
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gain the host country's acceptance, because only countries as a whole are the Parties to the Convention, and 
because JI projects are tied to agreements between governments. This is unique to JI projects compared with 
traditional development projects. Parikh,10 for example, argues that reforestation projects should be rejected since 
they do not involve technology transfer and lead to potential conflicts with development priorities, especially land 
use. Moreover, it is not enough that JI projects be not harmful because harmless projects that are unrelated to 
development priorities divert limited resources away from priority activities and thus involve high opportunity 
costs for the host countries. 
 Second, funding for JI projects should be additional to the current official development assistance of Annex 
II countries. In addition to emissions additionality, which requires that emissions should be reduced from what they 
would have been in the absence of the projects, the intent of financial additionality is that the funding for JI projects 
should not come from traditional development budgets packaged under a new name, because the developing 
countries generally fear that Annex II countries will redefine existing development aid projects as JI projects and 
thus reduce their aid budgets accordingly, and because small developing countries particularly fear that Annex II 
countries will tend to turn their attention towards those developing countries with large economies and greenhouse 
gas emissions. 
 In order to make sure that any resources for JI are additional, the Annex II countries should at least allocate 
a certain percentage of their GNP to official development assistance (ODA).11 If such an agreed threshold cannot 
be established, it is very important to keep the funds used for JI projects clearly distinguishable from those of the 
existing ODA. Limiting the contributions of JI to domestic GHG emission reduction obligations in Annex II 
countries as well as giving the Annex II only credit for part of the emission reduction achieved abroad may also 
help to reduce demand for JI projects12 and hence the incentives to shift the funding from the existing ODA, taking 
into account both the environmental effectiveness and economic efficiency. Otherwise, the developing countries 
would probably remain sceptical about JI. 
 Third, priorities should be given to JI projects for limiting emissions over projects for enhancing carbon 
sinks. In the proposed criteria from Canada, the Netherlands, Norway, and the USA, it has been stated that it 
should be possible for so-called sinks projects to become JI projects. Indeed, until now, projects for enhancing 
sinks through reforestation, afforestation or efficient forest use account for a large proportion of the existing 
projects that have been suggested to qualify in principle as officially recognizable JI projects. This is because 
projects of this type currently represent the least cost option. It may also be motivated by a concern to operate at a 
manageable level, with the goal of testing JI within the framework of the Climate Convention in order to gain 
concrete experience and to convince hitherto sceptical countries of the potential of JI projects. 
 
    10 J.K. P a r i k h : Joint Implementation and North-South Cooperation for Climate Change, in: International 
Environmental Affairs, Vol. 7, 1995, No. 1, pp. 22-41. 
    11 Cf. O. K u i k , P.  P e t e r s  and N.  S c h r i j v e r  (eds.): Joint Implementation to Curb Climate Change: 
Legal and Economic Aspects, Kluwer Academic Publishers, Dordrecht, The Netherlands 1994; R.  L o s k e  and  
S.  O b e r t h ü r , 1994, op. cit. 
    12 Reduced crediting is superior to limiting the contributions of JI, because it can provide an “environmental 
bonus” and allow for the uncertainty about measurement of likely environmental effects at a margin. However, if 
limits are imposed on the contributions of JI, in order to lower transaction costs, such limits should be imposed on 
each investor rather than on the total national level. Moreover, they should differ per type of project. 
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 By contrast, countries like Denmark have proposed that JI should not include sinks projects. The JI criteria 
from the Australian Pilot Phase JI Programme also suggest that JI projects should reduce net greenhouse gas 
emissions. Their objections to including sinks projects appear to be mainly practical considerations, because there 
are great uncertainties surrounding the true measures of carbon fixed, because there is the danger that countries 
may clear forests to have room for such JI projects later on, and because there are high risks associated with such 
long-term sink-enhancing JI projects.13 This may also be because sinks projects tend to merely postpone the 
problem of GHG emissions rather than solve it. 
 Faced with such sharp divergences in the proposed criteria, we think that priority should be given to JI 
projects for limiting emissions, at the same time not excluding JI sinks projects. This stance can be explained 
briefly as follows. 
 While the investor countries regard abated global GHG emissions as the most important benefits from JI 
projects, a large number of host (developing) countries regard local environmental problems as their own 
environmental priorities.14 They are more concerned with local pollutants, such as SO2, NOx and particulates from 
fossil fuel burning, because emissions of these pollutants cause serious health hazards and large environmental 
damage. Sinks projects have a favourable climate effect, but do not contribute to the reductions of these local 
pollutants and thus to solving local environmental problems. 
 Moreover, the current emission stabilization target for industrialized countries is not sufficient to achieve 
the Climate Convention's ultimate objective of stabilizing GHG concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that 
would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system. Given the fact that developing 
countries are expected to experience emission increases in the coming decades and are not expected to make any 
new commitments going beyond the currently general ones under the FCCC which may hinder their economic 
growth and development, the achievement of the ultimate objective will rely on strengthened obligations for 
industrialized countries to limit their own emissions or on JI projects for limiting emissions. Since the former is 
considered too costly and not cost-effective by industrialized countries, which is the reason for JI, main reliance 
should thus be placed on JI projects for limiting emissions in order to achieve the Climate Convention's ultimate 
goal. 
 These arguments by no means exclude JI sinks projects. Take deforestation as an example. All forests store 
carbon, but deforestation will release carbon dioxide into the atmosphere that will contribute to the accelerated 
greenhouse effect.15 Brown and Pearce16 and Pearce17 have shown that the carbon storage value of forests is 
 
    13 Cf. P. B o h m : On the Feasibility of Joint Implementation of Carbon Emissions Reduction, in: A. 
A m a n o  e t  a l .  (eds.): Climate Change: Policy Instruments and their Implications, Proceedings  of  the 
Tsukuba  Workshop of  IPCC  Working  Group III,  Tsukuba,  Japan 1994, pp. 181-198. 
    14 Cf. T. J o n e s : Operational Criteria for Joint Implementation, in: OECD: The Economics of Climate 
Change, Paris 1994, pp. 109-125. 
    15 The release rate of carbon dioxide differs, depending on the method of clearance and subsequent land use. 
    16 Cf. K. B r o w n  and D. P e a r c e : The Economic Value of Non-Market Benefits of Tropical Forests: 
Carbon Storage, in: J. W e i s s  (ed.): The Economics of Project Appraisal and the Environment, Edward Elgar, 
Aldershot, England 1994, pp. 102-123. 
    17 Cf. D. P e a r c e : Global Environmental Value and the Tropical Forests: Demonstration and Capture, in: 
W.L.  A d a m o w i c z  and P.  B o x a l l  et al. (eds.): Forestry, Economics and the Environment, Cab 
International, Wallingford, United Kingdom 1996, pp. 11-48. 
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several times the domestic value. Thus, the sensitive, biologically diverse and rich forests of the developing 
countries could become a source of revenue not for timbering and clearing, but for preservation and enhancement. 
This, combined with global concern about tropical deforestation, suggests that avoiding deforestation through 
measures such as JI could become a potentially important means of reducing the greenhouse effect. Moreover, 
since tropical forests are generally located in tropical (developing) countries and since deforestation is mainly in 
those countries, opportunities for sink enhancement are generally largest in those countries, in which some 
industrialized countries, if not all, want to implement JI projects. Furthermore, avoiding deforestation is also in line 
with the national priorities of some of those countries. Thus, from the perspective of those countries, sinks 
enhancement for avoiding deforestation should not be excluded. 
 Fourth, guidelines should be established for the reporting of the performance of JI projects with respect to 
methodologies for calculating project baselines and actual emissions and for monitoring, verification and audit. 
The success of JI will critically depend on the ease with which JI projects can be arranged between interested 
parties. Standardizing the reporting procedures and requirements for JI projects would lower transaction costs and 
thus help to foster the development of JI projects. By placing emphasis on the documentation of all sources, 
methods, emission factors, and assumptions, it would also make it possible for an independent third party to 
validate the emissions estimates and project effects. 
 
The Commitments of Annex I Countries 
 
 The extent to which non-Annex I countries would work together with Annex I countries in implementing JI 
projects depends on the Annex I commitments to be made at the upcoming third CoP to the FCCC scheduled to be 
held in Kyoto in December 1997. We think that such commitments should include the following: 
 
 First, Annex I countries should strengthen their existing commitments under the FCCC with respect to 
GHG emission targets and timetables, and transfers of financial resources, technology and expertise. Although 
much progress has been made since the 1992 Earth Summit in understanding the science of climate change, 
progress in the implementation of the FCCC has not been up to expectations. Indeed, most of Annex I countries 
continue to increase their emissions along an upward trajectory, which will result in their failing to meet their 
current commitments to returning their GHG emissions to their 1990 levels by the year 2000. Moreover, 
developing countries complain that Annex I countries have not lived up to the promise they made in Rio de Janeiro 
to help non-Annex I countries be greener. They continue to insist that Annex I countries must first meet their 
agreed commitments before non-Annex I countries will consider taking on additional commitments. The European 
Union (EU) broke the ice by offering a negotiation position of a 15% cut in emissions of a basket of three gases - 
CO2, CH4 and N2O - below 1990 levels by 2010. The proposed target is for the EU as a whole, with targets for 
individual member states ranging from plus 40% for Portugal to minus 30% for Luxembourg. The EU proposal is 
the first formal one from Annex I countries, which contains a concrete target for emissions reductions. Although 
the proposal is just the EU negotiation position, not a commitment the EU will undertake on its own, it is seen by 
advocates of early action as a very crucial step in the right direction. 
 By permitting a 30-40% increase in emissions to Greece and Portugal, the EU proposal for internal 
community burden sharing accepts that poorer countries should be treated more leniently, although it has been 
considered inconsistent with the EU opposition to differentiated emissions targets among Annex I countries. But if 
Greece and Portugal can have this sort of rise, what leeway should be allowed for the really poor, i.e. non-Annex I 
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countries. Moreover, given the fact that many EU countries have still been on an upward trajectory of GHG 
emissions since 1990, the proposal has raised the question whether the proposed emission reductions within the 
suggested time-frame are realistic. Besides, the EU and the USA have been bickering. The USA, with the backing 
of Australia, Canada and Japan, has been critical of the EU insistence on mandatory policies and measures as well 
as short-term targets. Although the USA appears not to reject proposals for setting legally binding targets for 
emission reductions, it is unlikely to agree to any targets unless it knows what flexibility it could have. Here 
flexibility refers to the following: 
 
 would the carbon permits be issued as an emissions budget over a period?  
 
 can early-achievement be banked for future use and can under-achievement in the current period be fulfilled by 
the permits borrowed from a subsequent period?  
 
 can emission reductions be achieved "offshore" through emissions trading or joint implementation?  
 
 Clearly, the ongoing tension over the responsibilities of different parties to the FCCC suggests that if there 
were any concrete commitments and emission targets specified at the upcoming third CoP, they would only be the 
result of negotiation among the parties themselves. 
 Second, Annex I countries should provide adequate domestic incentives to encourage their private sector 
participation in JI projects. JI can only be successful if there is the active involvement of the private sector in 
project financing. 
 
The Baselines 
 
 By definition, the baseline refers to the path of GHG emissions without any JI project. The baseline is 
deemed necessary in order to measure emission reductions resulting from JI projects and ensure correct crediting 
between the parties concerned. This is because, by establishing the baseline, we reduce the danger of the so-called 
double counting, where both investor and host parties claim the right to deductions on the basis of the same 
reduction volume. Moreover, by establishing the baseline, we reduce the free-rider effects. Otherwise, a JI deal 
might sanction a reduction that would have taken place anyway. Furthermore, establishing the baseline at the 
highest possible aggregated level, be it the national or even the international level, would reduce the leakage effects 
which occur when reduced GHG emissions in one place are counteracted by increased emissions elsewhere in the 
same host country or even in other countries as a direct or indirect effect of the JI project itself.18 From this, it 
therefore follows that the suggestion that the baselines are not needed for JI deals under the FCCC is suspect.19 
 For Annex I countries, the Climate Convention commits them to cut down emissions of CO2 and other 
greenhouse gases to their 1990 levels by the year 2000. Since the baselines of Annex I countries are related to their 
 
    18 Direct effect of a JI project means that, for example, the coal that is saved by a JI project aimed at improving 
the efficiency of a power station may be used for another power station in the same host country, while indirect 
effects refer to those that can arise as a result of the changes in relative prices and behaviour via a JI project. 
    19 Jones, for example, suggests that no attempt should be made to determine the baselines. Cf. T. J o n e s , 
1994, op. cit. 
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historical (1990) emission levels, there is little uncertainty about their future levels. However, for the developing 
countries with no abatement commitments under the FCCC, establishing their future national baselines is not a 
simple matter. First of all, this is because the baseline can never actually be observed. Put another way, it is 
impossible to observe what would have happened if JI deals had not been implemented. 
 Second, the definition of the baseline itself is not without conceptual problems. Given the fact that climate 
policy in the developing (host) countries is not so much about absolute emission reduction but about slowing the 
rate of growth of future GHG emissions, the host countries tend to "inflate" their baseline scenarios and regard any 
effort to reduce the growth of emissions as incremental. By contrast, the industrialized countries argue that the 
baselines in the host countries should be adjusted by eliminating projects that would have been carried out anyway 
by the host countries themselves and by subtracting emissions induced by energy subsidies and other economic 
distortions. As a result, they come to a much lower emissions baseline. Clearly, there is much controversy about 
the extent to which policy distortions and abatement projects should be included in the baseline. Thus, it is essential 
to come to a consensus on the baselines. 
 Third, there are great uncertainties surrounding the baseline. Fritsche20 shows that the variation in the 
baseline that is established for CO2 emissions in the European Union by different approaches is in the order of at 
least 10% of the national emissions. The variation in the baseline tends to be even greater for CO2 emissions in the 
developing countries and for emissions of other greenhouse gases than CO2. This underlines the need to establish a 
common methodology on the baseline. 
 Fourth, from the point of view of strategic behaviour, the developing countries may even be unwilling to 
establish their baselines because doing so may convey the impression that they would bind themselves to these 
aggregate emission paths. 
 At present, no developing countries have established national emission targets. Moreover, it is unlikely that 
these countries will adopt binding targets in the near future. This underlines the great uncertainty of obtaining an 
accurate evaluation of emissions for JI deals. The question arising from this is whether JI projects should be limited 
to countries that have national emission targets. The argument in favour of JI projects between countries that both 
have emission targets is that the requirements for measurement and control of JI projects are in any case reduced. 
Moreover, there is a great certainty that such projects will contribute to the reduction in global emissions. On the 
other hand, the argument for not limiting JI only to countries with national emission targets is that the developing 
countries, where the potential for cheap emission abatement JI investments is far greater than in Annex I countries, 
will be not excluded. In this case, the baselines at project level at least have to be developed in order to suffice for 
JI arrangements. 
 
The Verification of GHG Emission Reductions 
 
 Both the investor country and the host country have incentives to inflate the effect of JI projects. The 
investor countries may be tempted to inflate the volume of emission reduction from JI projects in order to receive 
greater credit than the JI projects merit, while the host countries may be tempted to inflate the potential for 
emission reduction from current JI projects in order to attract future JI projects given the fact that the investor 
countries attempt to get as much as possible out of their investment. Moreover, there are great uncertainties 
 
    20 Cf. U. F r i t s c h e : The Problems of Monitoring and Verification of Joint Implementation, in: Climate 
Network Europe (ed.): Joint Implementation from a European NGO Perspective, Brussels 1994, pp. 13-24. 
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associated with the measurement of the actual emission reduction of a given JI project itself. All this, combined 
with the complexities in establishing the baseline, underlines the need for the verification of the GHG emission 
reduction in order to ensure correct crediting. 
 Since both the investor party and the host party have an incentive to exaggerate the emission reduction, it is 
particularly desirable that the verification is carried out by an objective third party that should be agreed to by both 
partners. The verification is only responsible for deciding whether to accept the calculated GHG emission 
reduction or not. It is not the purpose of the verification to evaluate the acceptability of the JI project. It is up to the 
host and investor countries to decide what their definition of a JI project is. 
 For a given JI project, the extent of verification requirements depends on its characteristics and duration. 
Ceteris paribus, the more intensive the verification, the higher the transaction costs associated with measurement 
and inspection of the JI project. In order to reduce the costs, it is therefore desirable to establish the standardized 
verification method for each category of JI projects and to make use of the existing, suitable institutional apparatus 
as much as possible.21 
 Since the pilot JI projects are just being launched, verifying the GHG emission reduction of JI projects is 
still at the initial stage. Moreover, great differences exist in the national conditions among the host countries. Thus, 
it is not surprising that a wide range of possible institutions from fairly decentralized to quite centralized have been 
suggested. In examining the roles for potential institutions in China, for example, Zhou and Li22 suggest that the 
Energy Research Institute of the State Planning Commission could function as a third party to evaluate energy-
related JI projects, and that the Chinese Academy of Environmental Sciences of the National Environmental 
Protection Agency could inspect those JI projects aimed at environmental control. Moreover, on the basis of 
sovereignty considerations, they do not believe that the Chinese government would react positively to international 
verification, although the limited involvement of some sort of United Nations' related team would be acceptable. 
Clearly, verification of this type is of a centralized structure. It would be preferred to a decentralized project-related 
verification because the former is carried out by means of the standardized procedure. However, the central 
solution at the national level cannot avoid the dangers of bureaucracy and abuse of power and is costly in 
comparison with a decentralized solution, because every JI project has to be evaluated by a single authority. On the 
other hand, it allows continuous improvement of the verification method by learning the lessons from failed JI 
projects.23 
 In verifying the GHG emission reduction, it is conceivable that the event of disagreement about the results 
of a verification could arise. Thus, it is essential for the CoP to establish a dispute settlement procedure that could 
be based on the FCCC multilateral consultative mechanism, or the independent panel model currently being used at 
the World Bank, or another mechanism. Whatever the procedure that is eventually established, it should be made 
available for all disagreements about the verification results brought by any host and investor parties. Once the 
dispute is settled, sanctions can therefore be imposed fairly on the parties for breaches of contract. 
 
    21 Cf. Nordic Council of Ministers, 1995, op. cit. 
    22 D.D. Z h o u  and J.F. L i : Case Study of China, in: M. M a b e l , E. W a t t  and J. S a t h a y e  (eds.): 
Perspectives on the Institutional Needs of Joint Implementation Projects for China, Egypt, India, Mexico, and 
Thailand, Lawrence Berkeley Laboratory, Berkeley, California 1995, pp. 43-53. 
    23 Cf. A. M i c h a e l o w a : Joint Implementation of Greenhouse Gas Reductions under Consideration of 
Fiscal and Regulatory Incentives, HWWA-Report No. 153, HWWA, Hamburg 1995. 
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Potential Areas for JI Projects with China24 
 
 The growing environmental concern built into both international and national programmes and China's 
rapid integration into the world economy tend to make China more amenable to international cooperation on the 
environment. Indeed, China has been supporting international cooperation on combating global warming in 
accordance with the principle of "common but differentiated responsibilities". China played an active role in 
preparing the FCCC and in the IPCC, co-chairing its Energy and Industry Subgroup of the Working Group III. At 
present, China is actively participating in a negotiating process aimed at producing a protocol or another legal 
instrument to deal with the threat of climate change in the post 2000 period in accordance with the Berlin Mandate. 
Until now, the Chinese government has ratified the FCCC and China's Agenda 21. A National Group of Co-
ordination on Climate Change has been established with the involvement of 18 ministerial agencies. Its mission is 
to co-ordinate ministries and agencies in their efforts to address climate change, with the four working groups 
dealing with scientific assessment, impact assessment and response strategies, economic implications, and matters 
related to the Convention respectively. China has also made great efforts to abolishing current subsidies for energy 
consumption, reducing barriers to trade and to protecting intellectual property rights in order to facilitate the 
transfer and spread of economically viable low-carbon or carbon-free advanced energy technologies. All this at 
least indicates China's genuine concern about the potential impacts of climate change and its willingness to take all 
possible measures to limit the growth of its own per capita GHG emissions.  
 If Annex I countries have showed that they are really taking the lead in significantly reducing their GHG 
emissions within a short time-frame and are living up to their commitments to providing adequate transfers of 
financial resources, technology and expertise, and if the four-year AIJ pilot phase turns out to be a success, then an 
increasing number of developing countries will become more positive to the concept of JI. Only then will there be 
a reasonable prospect of joint implementation of abating GHG emissions between developed and developing 
countries, and China will no longer be sceptical about JI and tend to cooperate on JI projects. If this were the case, 
what then would be the potential areas in China's interest? 
 It is usually acknowledged that the success of JI premises an effective understanding of local (host country) 
development aspirations and the use of JI to push ahead with efforts to achieve these aspirations. Thus, in order to 
enhance their possibility of success, there is the need to take due consideration of local objectives and local 
conditions in designing JI projects. At present, the Chinese government has not approved any JI projects, and JI 
discussions have mainly remained confined to a very small circle of policymakers who are closely involved in 
climate change issues. Thus, at this stage, it is very difficult to say what the government preference is. Considering 
that the Chinese government is more concerned with local pollutants, such as SO2, NOx and particulates from coal 
burning, and regards them as its own environmental priorities, however, we do not expect that the Chinese 
government would give priority to sink-enhancing JI projects. This at least indicates a preference for those JI 
 
    24 All the statistics for China used in this section are taken from ZhongXiang Z h a n g : The Economics of 
Energy Policy in China: Implications for Global Climate Change, op. cit. 
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projects that reduce GHG emissions through increased energy efficiency and fuel switch. JI projects of this type 
not only have a favourable climate effect, but also contribute to the reduction of local pollutants. Then, specifically, 
what are the potential areas for JI projects that may be in China's interest? We think they could include those aimed 
at improving the efficiency of energy use, pushing the efficient use of coal, speeding up the development of 
hydropower and nuclear power and developing renewables. These emission-abating options, though aimed at 
reducing GHG emissions, will contribute to solving local environmental problems and thus will be beneficial to a 
more sustainable development of the Chinese economy. 
 
Efficiency of Energy Use 
 
 Energy conservation is of vital importance to China, not only because it saves depletable energy resources 
and reduces pressure on transportation and environmental pollution, but mainly because severe shortages in energy 
supply have been inhibiting its economic development. It is estimated that China's energy demand in 2000 will be 
of the order of 1400 to 1700 million tons of coal equivalent (tce), even if energy conservation is taken into account, 
whereas the domestic supply will be likely only to meet 1400 million tce. Thus, if China's development plan is to 
materialize, the gap has to be filled through increased efforts directed at energy conservation and enhanced energy 
efficiency. 
 Indeed, the Chinese government has been placing great emphasis on energy conservation in the past 
decade. A series of measures has been implemented concerning the administrative, legislative, economic and 
technological aspects of energy policies. Great progress in decoupling its GDP growth from energy consumption 
has been made, with an annual growth of 9.9% for the former but 5.2% for the latter during the period 1980-95. 
This achievement corresponds to an income elasticity of energy consumption of 0.52, an accumulated energy 
savings of 630 million tce and to an annual saving rate of 4.3%. While China has enjoyed such a great success in 
energy conservation, its energy use per unit of GDP is still among the highest in the world. This high energy 
intensity in China reflects an unusually large share of energy-intensive industrial production in the Chinese 
economy, a large share of energy-intensive manufacturing in China's industry, a high proportion of coal consump-
tion, and undervaluation of China's GDP. Concerning that direct cross-country comparison of energy use per unit 
of output value can provide only a rough picture of relative energy intensities in selected countries,25 comparing in 
physical terms the energy use of the major energy-intensive industries (i.e. iron and steel industry, chemical 
industry, building materials industry and power industry) and devices (i.e. industrial boilers that consume about 
one-third of the indigenous coal production) in China with those of other countries clearly indicates that the energy 
efficiency in China is also at the low end (see Table 3). 
 
Pushing Efficient Use of Coal 
 
 Over the past few years, coal has accounted for more than 75% of China's primary energy consumption. 
The coal-dominant structure of energy consumption is not expected to change in the foreseeable future. Given this 
prospect and the serious environmental pollution arising from inefficient coal use, China's efforts to combat air 
 
    25 Cf. ZhongXiang Z h a n g , ibid. 
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pollution must be directed at much more efficient use of coal. The policy measures that have been and will 
continue to be implemented include the following: 
  increasing the proportion of raw coal washed; energy efficiency studies show that power plant efficiency is 
decreased by 0.2% for each percentage increase in ash content. Given average ash reductions of 5-7% attributed 
to washing for steam coal and even higher reductions for coking coal, the overall efficiency savings could be 
substantial; 
  popularizing domestic use of coal briquettes; coal stoves using coal briquettes can reduce coal consumption by 
20-30%, CO emissions by 70-80%, and SO2 emissions by 40-50% if sulphur-fixing additives are added to the 
briquettes; 
  substitution of direct burning of coal by electricity through development of large-size, high-temperature and 
high-pressure efficient coal-fired power plants; 
  expanding district heating systems and developing cogeneration; 
  increased penetration of town gas into urban households; town gas from coal gasification plants is one of the 
only long-term options for displacing direct coal burning in China's residential sector; 
  development and diffusion of environmentally sound coal technologies; given China's huge coal reserves that 
are 12.7 times its proven recoverable oil and natural gas reserves combined, the development of clean coal 
technologies, such as circulating fluidized bed combustion boilers, coal-water slurry, and coal gasification com-
bined cycle, must be part of China's long-term energy strategy. 
 
Hydropower and Nuclear Power 
 
 China's hydropower potential is estimated to be the largest in the world, and its economically exploitable 
capacity totals 378 GW, corresponding to 1920 TWh of annual electricity production. By the end of 1994, 
however, the total capacity installed of hydropower plants was only 13% of the exploitable potential, considerably 
less than that of the industrialized countries and also below that of developing countries such as Brazil and India. 
Given China's abundant hydropower resources, their underdevelopment and their importance as an alternative to 
coal use for electricity generation, this current situation means that considerable efforts need to be devoted to 
speeding up hydropower exploitation in some river sections with favourable exploitation conditions. As for nuclear 
power, two power stations have been commissioned based on the most matured commercial pressurized-water 
reactors, specifically, Qinshan Nuclear Power Station in Zhejiang province and Daya Bay Nuclear Station in 
Guangdong province. This marks the start of the development of nuclear power in China. 
 Hydropower and nuclear power have so far provided the only proven methods with enormous potential for 
large-scale generation of electricity without a parallel production of CO2 emissions. In the short to medium term 
(before 2010), however, China has little alternative but to rely on coal for power generation because long leadtimes 
and high capital costs (see Table 4) pose difficulties for the expansion of both hydropower and nuclear power to 
meet the projected rapidly increasing electricity demand.26 
 
Developing Renewables 
 
    26 Cf. ZhongXiang Z h a n g , ibid; ZhongXiang Z h a n g : Cost-Effective Analysis of Carbon Abatement 
Options in China's Electricity Sector, in: Energy Sources, Vol. 20, 1998, Nos. 4/5 (Special Issue on Energy, Envi-
ronment and Sustainable Development). 
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 China is abundant in renewables. This abundance, combined with energy shortages in China as a whole and 
in the rural areas in particular, suggests that attention should be paid to the development of renewables to supple-
ment conventional energy resources in the long-term energy plan. However, as shown in Table 4, renewable 
energy plants, such as wind and PV plants, are still too costly in comparison with conventional coal and 
hydroelectric plants. Technically, they have yet to prove their feasibility for large-scale electricity production. 
Given the severe shortages of capital resources in China and the limitations of these renewable technologies 
themselves, renewables are expected to play only a limited role in the short to medium term (before 2010), altho-
ugh total generating capacity of renewables is expected to be expanded at a faster  
peace than those of coal-fired power.27 
 
 
 
Conclusions 
 
 The industrialized countries are currently responsible for the majority of global GHG emissions, and must 
bear the major burden of the emission abatement. Thus, if the North, particularly Annex II countries, are really 
serious about tackling global warming by JI, they must demonstrate once and for all that they are really taking the 
lead in reducing their GHG emissions and providing adequate technology transfer and financing. This is the best 
means of encouraging developing country participation and convincing hitherto sceptical developing countries of 
JI as a cost-effective climate measure. Moreover, given the breadth of the subject of JI and its close linkage with 
national sovereignty, global political agenda, and national development priorities, a wide and successful 
implementation of JI will be conditional upon consensus on a variety of operational issues such as the form of JI, 
criteria for JI, the establishment of baselines against which the effects of JI projects can be measured, and the 
verification of emission reductions of JI projects. Even if such a consensus were reached, given the fact that AIJ/JI 
remains virtually unknown to the majority of social and economic sectors in China as in most developing countries, 
it is still unrealistic to expect that AIJ/JI projects with China work as smoothly and fast as the industrialized 
countries wish. This underlines the need to promote JI through pilot projects in China's interest and capacity 
building in China in order to make JI gain ground and provide mutual benefits to all the parties involved. 
Furthermore, the extent of China's cooperation on JI will to some extent depend on the certainties about climate 
change. This in turn underlines the need for the scientific community to continue its efforts to clarify the scientific 
basis for understanding the climate change problem in order to lower the uncertainties about its magnitude, timing 
and regional patterns. 
 
 
 
 
27 Cf. ZhongXiang Z h a n g , ibid. 
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Table 1 
Main Macroeconomic Effects for China in 2010 
(Percentage Deviations Relative to the Baseline; -: Declines) 
 
 Scenario 1 Scenario 2 
GNP 
Welfare 
Private consumption 
Investment 
Exports 
Imports 
Energy consumption 
CO2 emissions 
Price elasticity of carbon abatement 
 
Price of coal 
Price of oil 
Price of natural gas 
Average price of fossil fuels 
Price of electricity 
Terms-of-trade 
Nominal wage rate 
Real exchange rate 
User price of capital 
Prices of exports 
Prices of imports 
-1.521 
-1.078 
-1.165 
-0.686 
-5.382 
-1.159 
-19.468 
-20.135 
-0.396 
 
64.954 
15.296 
46.813 
50.888 
22.785 
3.636 
-1.807 
-0.004 
-1.777 
3.633 
-0.004 
-2.763 
-1.753 
-2.972 
-1.832 
-7.447 
-2.128 
-29.322 
-30.112 
-0.317 
 
123.095 
29.144 
90.564 
94.895 
43.256 
3.822 
-3.043 
-0.021 
-4.228 
3.801 
-0.021 
 
Sources: ZhongXiang Zhang: The Economics of Energy Policy in China: Implications for Global Climate Change, 
Edward Elgar Publishing Limited, Cheltenham, England 1997; ZhongXiang Zhang: Macroeconomic Effects of 
CO2 Emission Limits: A Computable General Equilibrium Analysis for China, in: Journal of Policy Modeling, 
Vol. 20, 1998, No. 2, pp. 213-250. 
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Table 2 
Carbon Taxes across Regions in 2010 
(at 1985 $ per Ton of Carbon) 
 
 USA Japan EEC Total OECD China World 
Scenario 1 
Scenario 2 
53.4 
120.3 
55.9 
103.1 
85.7 
158.6 
62.7 
132.3 
10.1 
18.3 
45.1 
92.9 
 
Sources: cf. Table 1. 
 
 
 
Table 3 
A Comparison of Unit Energy Consumption in Some Energy-Intensive Industries and Devices 
 
 1980 
China 
1994 
China 
Advanced level 
abroad 
Comparable energy consumption per ton of steel (tce/t) 
Energy consumption per ton of synthetic ammonia (tce/t) 
      Large plants 
      Small plants 
Energy consumption per ton of cement clinker (kgce/t) 
Net coal consumption of coal-fired plants (gce/kWh) 
Thermal efficiency of industrial boilers (%) 
1.30 
 
1.45 
2.90 
206.5 
448 
1.03a 
 
1.34a 
2.09 
175.3 
413 
60-70 
0.6 (Italy) 
1.2 
 
 
108.4 (Japan) 
327 (ex-USSR) 
80-85 
 
a In 1990. 
 
Source: ZhongXiang Zhang: The Economics of Energy Policy in China: Implications for Global Climate Change, 
Edward Elgar Publishing Limited, Cheltenham, England 1997. 
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Table 4 
A Comparison of Alternative Power Plants at a 10% Discount Rate 
 
 Capital recovery cost 
(cent/kWh)a 
Marginal costb 
(yuan/tC)a 
Coal power (<200 MW) 
Coal power (200 MW ~ 300 MW) 
Coal power (>300 MW) 
Hydroelectric power (>25 MW) 
Mini-hydroelectric power (≤25 MW) 
Pumped storage hydroelectric power 
Nuclear power (300 MW) 
Nuclear power (600 MW ~ 1000 MW) 
Imported natural gas-fired power 
Wind-driven power generation 
Decentralized mini-wind power generator 
Centralized solar photovoltaic (PV) power 
Decentralized solar PV power  
Biomass-based power generation 
Geothermal-based power generation 
5.320 
4.811 
4.960 
13.084 
15.605 
21.606 
21.086 
20.219 
10.581 
28.065 
39.040 
112.105 
162.870 
26.520 
16.386 
- 
-744.320 
-602.083 
-167.558 
-60.025 
 208.045 
 407.627 
 359.367 
 917.289 
 552.926 
1118.777 
3914.607 
5847.905 
 483.448 
 240.807 
 
a Measured at 1990 prices, 1 yuan = 100 cent. 
b Coal-fired power of unit capacity of less than 200 MW has been chosen as the reference, whereas other options 
considered are regarded as abatement technologies. Marginal cost per ton of carbon abated by each abatement 
technology is measured against this reference. 
 
Sources: ZhongXiang Zhang: The Economics of Energy Policy in China: Implications for Global Climate Change, 
Edward Elgar Publishing Limited, Cheltenham, England 1997; ZhongXiang Zhang: Cost-Effective Analysis of 
Carbon Abatement Options in China's Electricity Sector, in: Energy Sources, Vol. 20, 1998, Nos. 4/5. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
